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I.  INTRODUCTION 
On March 31, 2010, the United States Supreme Court decided 
Padilla v. Kentucky.1  This decision forever alters criminal defense 
attorneys’ duty to advise their clients about the deportation 
consequences of a guilty plea.  The Court held that when 
deportation consequences are “truly clear,” a criminal defense 






        †   Joanna Woolman is an adjunct professor at William Mitchell College of 
Law.  She is the director of the Reentry Clinic.   
 1. Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010).  Justice Stevens wrote for the 
majority, joined by Justices Kennedy, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor.  Justice 
Alito wrote a concurrence joined by Chief Justice Roberts.  Justice Scalia wrote a 
dissent, joined by Justice Thomas. 
 2. Id. at 1483. 
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Never before has the Court held that there is a duty to advise 
clients about a “collateral” consequence to a plea.3  The duty it 
creates to provide accurate and client-centered representation 
around the issue of deportation is a huge step forward because it 
greatly expands the responsibilities of a criminal defense 
attorney—it is now a violation of the Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel not to advise about a collateral sanction. 
The Padilla opinion is a wake-up call—that in order to provide 
effective representation in this day and age, where the number of 
collateral consequences is rapidly growing—it is not enough to 
simply advise clients about the direct criminal sanctions of their 
conviction in the context of deportation.  The reason is because 
other collateral consequences exist that are just as clear and just as 
dire.  This article argues that Padilla must be applied to these other 
circumstances where statutory civil consequences that stem from a 
criminal conviction are “truly clear,”4 meaning direct, and “most 
difficult”5 to divorce from the conviction, meaning dire. 
Collateral consequences are routinely discussed before a plea, 
and many defense attorneys try to advise their clients about as many 
of them as they can.  Clients often have no idea what other issues 
may await them after their conviction, so it is a defense attorney’s 
job to tell them.6 
Ideally, criminal defense attorneys would inform their clients 
about every collateral consequence that results from a plea.  
However, that may be impossible given that in Minnesota alone, 
more than two hundred collateral consequences exist.7  These 
consequences range in type and severity, including restrictions on 
 
 3. Id. at 1481 (citations omitted) (defining “collateral” consequence as a 
matter not within the sentencing authority of the state trial court). 
 4. Id. at 1483.  The court noted that when a collateral “consequence is ‘truly 
clear’ . . . the duty to give correct advice is equally clear.” Id. 
 5. Id. at 1481.  The court intimated that when the collateral consequence is 
hard to divorce from the conviction, there is an even stronger need for counsel to 
advise regarding the collateral consequence.  Id. 
 6. The author has worked as a public defender in Minnesota for five years, 
during which time she has advised hundreds of clients prior to a plea.  She has 
worked as a public defender in Isanti County, and most recently in Anoka County.  
Both counties are in the Tenth Judicial District of Minnesota.  The author, like 
many attorneys, tries to advise her clients of as many collateral consequences as 
she can. 
 7. Expunging Criminal Records, THE RIGHTS STUFF (Minn. Dep’t of Hum. Rts., St. 
Paul, Minn.), April 2009, at 13, available at http://www.humanrights.state.mn.us
/education/articles/rs_pdf/rs09_sprin0g.pdf [hereinafter Expunging Criminal 
Records]. 
2
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driving privileges, hunting rights, voting rights, and public 
housing.8  This article argues that there are three particular 
collateral consequences in Minnesota that clearly fall under the 
Padilla standard.  For these particular sanctions, defense attorneys 
must provide their clients clear and accurate information about 
them prior to a plea. 
In Section II, this article analyzes the Padilla case and argues 
that it has created a two-prong test for determining when a 
collateral consequence is direct and dire enough to require an 
attorney to clearly advise a criminal defendant about it prior to 
trial.  In Section III, this article provides examples of the support 
for a broader application of Padilla in the legal community.  In 
Section IV, this article argues that Padilla should control three 
particular collateral consequences in Minnesota because they are 
also direct and dire.  These three sanctions include child custody, 
disqualification for licensing by the Department of Health and 
Human Services (DHHS), and registration as a sex offender. 
II.  PADILLA’S NEW “TRULY CLEAR” STANDARD 
José Padilla, a native of Honduras and a Vietnam veteran, has 
been a permanent resident of the United States for more than forty 
years.9  After pleading guilty to the transportation of a large 
amount of marijuana in his tractor-trailer in Kentucky, he faced 
deportation.10  Padilla filed a claim for post-conviction relief 
alleging ineffective assistance of counsel.  Padilla claimed his 
attorney not only failed to advise of this consequence prior to his 
entering a plea, but also told him that he “did not have to worry 
about immigration status since he had been in the country so 
long.”11  Padilla relied on his attorney’s incorrect advice when he 
made the decision to enter a plea of guilty to drug charges that 
made his deportation virtually mandatory.12  The Court, in an 
opinion written by Justice Stevens,13 found that when a criminal 
defense attorney gives incorrect advice or omits advice to clients of 
their “truly clear” potential for deportation upon a guilty plea, the 
defense attorney is not providing adequate assistance of counsel 
 
 8. Id. 
 9. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1477. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. at 1478. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. at 1473. 
3
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pursuant to the Sixth Amendment as laid out by the Court in 
Strickland v. Washington.14  The Court found that the relevant terms 
of the immigration statute were clear, and that the consequence 
was sufficiently direct.15  Further, the Court agreed with Mr. Padilla 
that “constitutionally competent counsel would have advised him 
that his conviction for drug distribution made him subject to 
automatic deportation.”16 
The Court found that the civil consequence of being deported 
is a “particularly severe ‘penalty,’ but it is not, in a strict sense, a 
criminal sanction.”17  This civil consequence is “intimately related to 
the criminal process,” and the penalty of deportation is “most 
difficult” to divorce from the conviction.18  The Court found that in 
many cases, preserving a client’s right to remain in the United 
States may be “more important to the client than any potential jail 
sentence.”19  The Court declined to comment on whether that 
distinction is appropriate in other circumstances because it focused 
on deportation. 
The Court rejected the trial court’s assertion that there is no 
duty to advise about collateral matters—i.e., those matters not 
within the sentencing authority of the state trial court.20  Arguably, 
the Court left open whether this holding could be applied to other 
indirect consequences of a plea when it stated that it has never 
applied a distinction between direct and collateral consequences to 
define the scope of reasonable professional assistance required by 
the Constitution under Strickland.21  The Court cited to the 
overwhelming support for its decision among the defense bar.22  It 
pointed directly to the “weight of prevailing professional norms” 
 
 14. Id.  In Strickland v. Washington, the Court defined a two-part test to 
determine whether a defendant had a valid ineffective assistance of counsel claim 
within the meaning of the Sixth Amendment.  Strickland, 466 U.S. 668, 668 (1984).  
To satisfy this two-part test, an attorney’s representation must fall below “an 
objective standard of reasonableness” and there must be a reasonable probability 
that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would 
be different.  Id. at 688. 
 15. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1481 (finding the penalty of deportation “nearly an 
automatic result”). 
 16. Id. at 1478 (declining to rule on the second prong of Strickland and 
remanding the analysis to the trial court for further review). 
 17. Id. at 1481. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. at 1483. 
 20. Id. at 1481. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. at 1482. 
4
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that support the view that counsel must advise a client about the 
risk of deportation.23  The Court pointed out that “authorities of 
every stripe—including the American Bar Association, criminal 
defense and public defender organizations, authoritative treatises, 
and state and city bar publications—universally require defense 
attorneys to advise as to the risk of deportation consequences . . . .”24  
The Court did not discuss whether prevailing professional norms 
would support a wider application of this standard to other 
collateral consequences that were as direct and dire. 
The Padilla Court seems to have established a two-prong test to 
find that deportation requires a duty for defense attorneys to advise 
their clients.  First, Padilla established that deportation is a “truly 
clear” or nearly automatic consequence of certain criminal 
convictions.25  Second, the Court defined a collateral consequence 
as something that can be as punitive or dire as the conviction 
itself.26  The Court found that the penalty of deportation is “most 
difficult” to divorce from the conviction.27  Thus, the Court found 
that deportation was direct and dire, and that these two factors 
warranted an affirmative duty for criminal defense attorneys to 
advise their clients about this specific collateral consequence.28 
III.  SOURCES WITHIN THE LEGAL COMMUNITY THAT SUPPORT 
PADILLA’S HOLDING 
An amicus brief was filed in this case, affirming that many 
members of the legal community support a broader application of 
Padilla.29  This brief was signed by more than twenty criminal 
defense organizations.30  This large and diverse group found that 
 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. at 1483. 
 26. See id. at 1481–82. 
 27. Id. at 1481. 
 28. Id. at 1486–87. 
 29. See Brief of the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers et al. as 
Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010) 
(No. 08-651), 2009 WL 1567356 [hereinafter Padilla Amicus Brief]. 
 30. See id.  The signing organizations as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner 
are as follows: National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, National Legal 
Aid & Defender Association, Kentucky Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, 
Colorado Criminal Defense Bar, Immigration Impact Unit of the Massachusetts 
Committee for Public Counsel Services, New Mexico Criminal Defense Lawyers 
Association, New York State Defenders Association, Oregon Criminal Defense 
Lawyers Association, Texas Criminal Defense Lawyers Association, Washington 
5
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the criminal defense function includes advising the client of every 
important consequence of a plea.31  They concluded “A defense attorney 
who negotiates a plea resulting in the defendant’s effective exile, 
without so much as investigating that possibility or asking whether 
it matters to the defendant, has not fulfilled that attorney’s duty to 
the bar, to the Constitution, or, most of all, to the client.”32  They 
found that the fundamental client-centered approach at the heart 
of a defense counsel’s role demands that the attorney conduct a 
thorough “exploration with the client of all important 
consequences of a client’s decision to plead, regardless of whether 
those consequences are labeled ‘direct’ or ‘collateral.’”33 
The Padilla amicus brief did not suggest that this duty is not 
without logistical concerns.  They addressed specifically whether 
this duty would create an undue burden on defense counsel.34  The 
amici curiae ultimately concluded it would not, and that “these 
obligations are not only appropriate, but essential.”35  They relied 
on the overwhelming amount of information available to defense 
attorneys regarding deportation, including hundreds of training 
sessions, free websites containing specific information about 
deportation, and many national publications devoted to the issue 
of deportation as a result of a conviction.36  Accurate and easily 
accessible information about the consequences of immigration is 
easy to find and learn about for any attorney in criminal practice 
and is free of charge in many cases.37 
 
 
Defender Association, Legal Aid Society of the City of New York, Neighborhood 
Defender Service of Harlem, Defender Association of Philadelphia, Florence 
Immigrant and Refugee Rights Project, Immigrant Defense Project, Immigrant 
Legal Resource Center, and National Immigration Project of the National Lawyers 
Guild.  See id. 
 31. Padilla Amicus Brief, supra note 29, at *2. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. at *14. 
 34. Id. at *22.  The Padilla court also noted that attorneys in all practice areas 
must advise clients about consequences outside of their area of expertise, and that 
the requirement to do so in Padilla is not too big a burden on attorneys.  Padilla v. 
Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1492–93 (2010). 
 35. Padilla Amicus Brief, supra note 29, at *16. 
 36. Id. at *28. 
 37. See NATIONAL IMMIGRATION PROJECT OF THE NATIONAL LAWYERS GUILD, 
http://www.nationalimmigrationproject.org (last visited Oct. 25, 2010) (providing 
online resources and direct counseling to attorneys on the phone); IMMIGRATION 
DEFENSE PROJECT, http://www.immigrantdefenseproject.org (last visited Oct. 26, 
2010) (providing a hotline for attorneys advertised on the webpage). 
6
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Beyond these many resources relating to the specific issue of 
deportation as a civil sanction, there has also been a national 
movement focused on educating the bench and bar about 
collateral consequences.  In 2009, The Uniform Collateral 
Consequences of a Conviction Act (UCCCA) was established by the 
Uniform Law Commission, a national law reform group.38  The 
Uniform Law Commission was concerned about the increase and 
severity of collateral consequences, due in large part to the 
overwhelming increase in convictions in the United States.39 
The UCCCA was created to help attorneys and judges in 
different jurisdictions to impose some discipline on the process by 
which collateral consequences are enacted and enforced.40  A broad 
goal of the UCCCA is to help defense attorneys include 
consideration of collateral consequences prior to a plea by 
compiling and publishing them in an organized way—state by 
state.41  This register of consequences, once completed, can be an 
asset to attorneys who can look to one resource for a 
comprehensive list of collateral sanctions.  The UCCCA also 
contains provisions mandating that defendants be told at an early 
point in their case that certain collateral consequences may attach 
to their conviction.42  This reform act illustrates a national 
consensus that collateral consequences must be addressed by 




 38. National Conference of Commissioners of Uniform State Laws, UNIFORM 
COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF CONVICTION ACT (2009), available at http://www
.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/ucsada/2009_final.htm [hereinafter UCCCA]. 
 39. National Conference of Commissioners of Uniform State Laws, UNIFORM 
COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF CONVICTION ACT (2008 Draft), available at 
http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/ucsada/2008_amdraft.htm.  This 
Act was amended in the summer of 2010, and the amendments can be found on 
the same site. 
 40. See UCCCA, supra note 38; see also A FEW FACTS ABOUT THE … UNIFORM 
COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF CONVICTION ACT, http://www.nccusl.com/Update
/uniformact_factsheets/uniformacts-fs-uccca.asp (last visited Oct. 25, 2010) 
[hereinafter FACTS ABOUT THE UCCCA]. 
 41. See UCCCA, supra note 38; see also FACTS ABOUT THE UCCCA, supra note 
40. 
 42. UCCCA, supra note 38, at § 5. 
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IV.  APPLYING THE PADILLA STANDARD MORE BROADLY IN 
MINNESOTA 
The climate of practicing criminal defense is changing because 
increasingly more collateral consequences are triggered when a 
person pleads guilty.  Nationally, estimates state that in some states 
more than seven hundred collateral sanctions are imposed, with 
nearly eighty percent of them affecting employment, nearly all of 
which last for life.43  More people are affected by collateral 
consequences than ever before because more people than ever 
have been convicted of a crime—perhaps as many as one hundred 
million people.44 
In Minnesota, as is true nationally, the number and severity of 
collateral consequences is growing.  Although data about the exact 
number of collateral consequences in Minnesota is hard to 
pinpoint, some estimates state that more than two hundred may be 
imposed by statutes and regulations in Minnesota.45  The number 
of collateral sanctions has grown in the last decade, particularly in 
the area of sex offender registration.  This trend may be due to 
several serious and well-publicized violent sex crimes.46  Beyond the 
number of consequences, the number of individuals affected has 
grown in recent years, as Minnesota convicts and incarcerates more 
and more people.  In Minnesota, in 1982, less than one percent of 
the population was under correctional supervision.47  Twenty-five 
years later, this number has increased by 284%.48 
Collateral consequences for a conviction in Minnesota include 
many restrictions, such as revocation of driving privileges, 
suspension of a hunting license or right to possess a gun, 
ineligibility to vote, and disqualification from public benefits.49  
 
 43. Richard T. Cassidy, The Time to Reform our Law of Collateral Consequences has 
Arrived, ON LAWYERING: NEWS AND COMMENTARY ON THE LAW AND CULTURE OF 
LAWYERS, June 10, 2010, http://onlawyering.com/2010/06/the-time-to-reform-our 
-law-of-collateral-consequences-has -arrived/. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Expunging Criminal Records, supra note 7, at 13. 
 46. See, e.g., Bob Reha, Rodriguez guilty in Sjodin case, Minn. Pub. Radio, Aug. 
30, 2006, available at  http://minnesota.publicradio.org/display/web/2006/08/30
/rodriguezverdict/.  The rape and murder of Drew Sjodin led to several 
significant changes in Minnesota law relating to sex offenders in 2003 and 2004 
after the conviction of her killer.  Dru Sjodin National Sex Offender, U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, http://www.nsopw.gov (last visited Feb. 22, 2011). 
 47. Expunging Criminal Records, supra note 7, at 12. 
 48. Id. 
 49. MINN. STAT. § 609B.340–345 (2008) (providing for collateral sanctions 
8
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These are just a few examples of many.  While all collateral 
consequences negatively affect clients, three clear examples in 
Minnesota exist where the Padilla standard must be applied 
because the consequences are so direct and dire.  In these 
situations, not advising clients prior to a plea constitutes a violation 
of the new Padilla test.50  Such situations include: restrictions on 
custody, disqualification from licensing by the Minnesota 
Department of Health and Human Services, and all of the 
restrictions that accompany sex offender registration.51   
In Minnesota, these three civil consequences are found in 
three particular state statutes and are accessible to all criminal 
defense attorneys who possess a general criminal handbook for the 
state.52  In addition, many helpful and free websites are available to 
provide information about collateral sanctions in Minnesota,53 and 
regular CLE presentations and bar publications are available to 
help educate defense attorneys about the most serious 
consequences.54  Because the issue of collateral sanctions has been 
increasing on the state and national radar as more individuals are 
affected by them in their post-conviction lives, more resources have 
become available to help clients and attorneys make informed 
decisions.  
Below, this article discusses the stories of three people who 
were not adequately advised of collateral consequences that meet 
the Padilla test55 and how their lives have been altered by these 
collateral consequences.  All of these people now say their decision 
 
related to possession of firearms, explosives, and similar devices); MINN. STAT. § 
609B.600, 609B.610–615 (2008) (providing for collateral sanctions related to civil 
rights and remedies); MINN. STAT. § 609B.400, 609B.405–465 (2008) (providing for 
collateral sanctions related to services and public benefits). 
 50. See supra Section II. 
 51. MINN. STAT. §§ 518.179, 245C.15, 243.166 (2008). 
 52. WEST’S MINNESOTA CRIMINAL LAW HANDBOOK, (West’s Publishing ed., 2010 
ed. 2009).  This handbook is given to every public defender annually. 
 53. A cursory Google search yielded hundreds of websites dedicated to 
providing specific information about collateral sanctions in Minnesota.  Many of 
these sites are sponsored by private attorneys and some are sponsored by local 
nonprofits.  The entire list of collateral sanctions under Section 609B of the 
Minnesota code can be found on the Revisor of Statutes webpage.  See 2010 
Minnesota Statutes, Chapter 609B Collateral Sanctions, MINN. OFFICE OF THE 
REVISOR OF STATUTES, https://www.revisor.mn.gov/statutes/?id=609B&view=
chapter (last visited Nov. 1, 2010). 
 54. See Thomas C. Plunkett, Collateral Consequences and Expungement Update, 
ELIMINATION OF BIAS CLE (Apr. 20, 2010), available at http://www.clarionlegal.com
/index.cfm?page=Replay%20List#collateralconsequences. 
 55. See supra Section II. 
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to plead would certainly have been different if they had been 
advised of these consequences by their attorney.  These stories, like 
many others, illustrate how important it is that defense attorneys in 
Minnesota begin advising their clients about these consequences 
immediately; the stakes are simply too high for clients to plead 
without this knowledge. 
A.  Child Custody 
The first person is Tina, a woman who sought to regain 
custody of her children after being convicted of first-degree sexual 
conduct.56  Tina was a mother of three children and resided with 
her family in a small community in central Minnesota.  In 2006, 
Tina had a brief sexual relationship with her fifteen-year-old 
stepson who had recently moved into the family’s home and was a 
mentally unstable, violent teenager.  Shortly after this encounter, 
Tina became pregnant and had a daughter.  After her daughter was 
born, someone tipped off the authorities that the child did not 
belong to Tina’s husband, so Tina was arrested and charged with 
first-degree criminal sexual conduct.  Tina was represented by a 
public defender and, in her words, was strongly urged to take a 
plea bargain in this case to ensure she would spend less time in 
prison than the maximum prison sentence for this crime.57 
Section 518.179 of the Minnesota Code prevents people 
charged with certain crimes from having custody of their children.58  
This statute changes the standard and shifts the burden for custody 
and parenting time for individuals convicted of approximately 
twenty different crimes.59  Specifically, a person seeking child 
custody or parenting time, who has been convicted of one of these 
 
 56. The author met Tina two years ago in Minnesota through her work in the 
Reentry Clinic at William Mitchell College of Law.  Tina requested assistance from 
the clinic to help her regain custody of her children after being released from 
prison.  After two full years, and much litigation, the author is still working toward 
this goal for Tina.  Tina has agreed to let the author use her story in this paper, 
although the author has changed her name. 
 57. The mandatory sentence for first-degree criminal sexual conduct in 
Minnesota is 144 months in prison.  MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMM’N, 
MINNESOTA SENTENCING GUIDELINES AND COMMENTARY 59 (2010). 
 58. MINN. STAT. § 518.179, subdiv. 2 (2008). 
 59. Id.  The crimes for which child custody may be affected include murder, 
manslaughter, assault (first- through third-degrees), kidnapping, depriving 
another of parenting rights, criminal sexual conduct (first- through third-
degrees), solicitation of a child, incest, malicious punishment of a child, neglect of 
a child, terroristic threats, felony harassment, or stalking.  Id. 
10
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offenses, has the burden to prove that custody or parenting time is 
in the best interests of the child.60  This means a court must go 
above and beyond simply finding that a person has a right to be a 
parent.  The court must determine that an individual is fit to see 
his or her children based on certain factors.61  A guardian ad litem 
must be appointed by the court in each case where the court finds 
it is not in the best interests of the child to be returned to the 
parent.62 
This statutory consequence is direct and dire for many people 
in Minnesota, and it clearly meets the Padilla test.63  The 
consequence is “truly clear,”64 meaning that it follows directly from 
one of twenty or so convictions.  It is also dire because it is a penalty 
“most difficult”65 to divorce from the conviction.  As a practical 
matter, most people convicted of these offenses will not be able to 
regain custody of their children, or even secure regular visitation 
without the help of a lawyer.  A lawyer is something that many of 
them cannot afford.  The result is the loss of their family; for many 
women in particular, being a mother is the most important role of 
their lives. 
At no time during meetings with her attorney, or when she 
entered a plea in front of a judge, did her attorney or the judge 
advise Tina that entering a plea of guilty to this offense would make 
her ability to have custody of her children virtually impossible after 
she was released from prison.  She did not receive this information 
despite the fact that this consequence, stated in section 518.179 of 




 60. Id. at subdiv. 1.  
 61. Id.  The best interest factors are listed in section 518.17 of the Minnesota 
Code.  These factors include: the wishes of the child’s parent or parents; the 
reasonable preference of child (if child is of sufficient age); the child’s primary 
caretaker; the intimacy of the relationship between each parent and child; the 
interaction and interrelationship of the child with a parent or parents, and siblings 
or others; the child’s adjustment to home, school, and community; the length of 
time the child has lived in a stable environment and the desire to maintain this 
stability; the permanence as a family unit; and the mental and physical health of 
all individuals involved.  MINN. STAT. § 518.17, subdiv. 1 (2008). 
 62. § 518.179, subdiv. 1. 
 63. See supra Section II.  
 64. Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1483 (2010).  
 65. Id. at 1481.  
 66. MINN. STAT. § 518.179, subdiv. 2 (2008). 
11
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For people like Tina, the penalty of losing custody of their 
children is nearly as impossible to “divorce” from the conviction as 
Padilla states about the penalty of deportation.  Like deportation, 
the loss of child custody is a serious civil consequence.  The 
conviction may prevent Tina from ever having custody of her 
children again.  Like the federal deportation statutes in Padilla, this 
statute in Minnesota has been amended to include more crimes 
over time, thereby affecting a greater number of people.67 
Tina’s children are the most important part of her life.  If Tina 
had known that this plea would affect her ability to be a mother 
when she was released from prison, specifically because of a statute 
in Minnesota that made this consequence clear, she would not have 
pleaded guilty.  After three years, Tina only has limited and 
supervised visitation with her children and likely will never regain 
full custody of them. 
B.  Background Checks for Employment Requiring a DHHS License  
The next person is Beth, a woman who had worked for more 
than fifteen years in a nursing home requiring a Minnesota 
Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) license.68  This 
woman was charged with domestic assault for hitting her boyfriend 
after he had shoved her into a wall during a fight.  As a result of 
pleading guilty to fifth-degree domestic assault, for which she 
received the criminal sanction of a fifty dollar fine,69 Beth has been 
prevented from making a living in the field in which she was 
trained because the DHHS revoked her license for seven years after 
the DHHS learned of her conviction.70 
Beth is a single mother with two children under the age of five.  
Although she received food support and state medical benefits, she 
did not receive any cash assistance from the state.  Instead, she 
worked long hours to support her two children.  At the time Beth’s 
 
 67. Section 518.179 of the Minnesota Code was created in 1997.  MINN. STAT. 
§ 518.179 (1997).  The section has been amended three times since then.  Prior to 
1997, there were no defined convictions that affected custody.  See id. § 518.179, 
subdiv. 2 (1998). 
 68. Beth is not the real name of the individual described above.  The author 
has asked this woman’s permission to use her story in this article.  The author, 
Joanna Woolman, was the attorney who represented Beth two years ago in the 
story described above. 
 69. A misdemeanor in Minnesota is punishable by up to ninety days in jail 
and a $1000 fine.  MINN. STAT. § 609.03 (2008). 
 70. See MINN. STAT. § 245C.15, subdiv. 4(b) (2008). 
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attorney represented her, the attorney was familiar with section 
245C.15 of the Minnesota Code, and told Beth that this conviction 
may affect her ability to work in a nursing home.  The attorney 
encouraged Beth to look into this issue, and left it at that.  
However, had the attorney taken a more careful look at section 
245C.15 and the specific crimes and disqualification periods, the 
attorney would have realized that Beth’s conviction would result in 
an automatic seven-year disqualification and virtually guarantee 
that she would lose her job.71  This penalty is exponentially more 
serious than the conviction and fifty dollar fine she received in the 
criminal case. 
A person with a job or looking for a job that requires a DHHS 
license can have their career come to an abrupt end if they are 
convicted of certain crimes.  Section 245C.15 of the Minnesota 
Code contains the list of disqualifying crimes or conduct for 
individuals who either have or need to seek a license from the 
DHHS for many types of employment.72 
Individuals can be disqualified from receiving a license for life, 
for fifteen years, for ten years, and for seven years.73  For each 
period of disqualification, the statute lists the qualifying crimes.74  
Disqualification can occur based merely on an arrest.75  
Disqualification is a civil penalty, although directly related to a 
criminal conviction.  To challenge disqualification, most 
individuals will need legal counsel to navigate the administrative 
process. 
License disqualification under section 254C.15 of the 
Minnesota Code76 meets the Padilla standard because the 
consequences of a conviction upon a DHHS license are “truly 
clear.”77  The statute states that the commissioner of the DHHS 
shall conduct a background check for each individual applying for 
a position listed in the first subdivision in the statute.78  Therefore, 
 
 71. See id. at subdiv. 4(a)(2). 
 72. Id.  Section 245C.04 of the Minnesota Code includes a list of each type of 
job for which a background check and license is required by the DHHS.  MINN. 
STAT. § 245C.04 (2008).  These jobs include: all licensing programs, state agencies, 
personal care providers, supplemental nursing agencies, personnel agencies, and 
educational agencies.  Id. 
 73. See § 245C.15, subdiv. 1–4. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id.  
 76. Id. 
 77. Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1483 (2010).  
 78. § 254C.15, subdivs. 1–4. 
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if a person is employed in a job requiring a license, or plans to 
pursue a job requiring a license, a conviction listed in the statute 
will prevent that person from being considered because he or she 
cannot pass the regular background check. 
When people lose their ability to work in the field in which 
they were trained, that is a dire consequence.  If a person cannot 
earn a living, then that person is more likely to lose the stability in 
life that protects his or her family and wellbeing.  In particular, if a 
disqualification of a license is for life, then this penalty certainly is 
as serious, often more serious, than the criminal sanction.  Finally, 
while there are ways people may challenge this disqualification, 
realistically, not many people will be able to successfully challenge 
it without the assistance of an attorney—another reason this 
consequence is dire. 
There may have been nothing that could have been done to 
prevent this disqualification because even arrest records can be 
used in some cases to disqualify.79  But nevertheless, this client 
deserved to know the nearly automatic and “truly clear”80 
consequence of her plea.  With a closer read of this statute, Beth’s 
attorney could have helped her understand the specific and serious 
consequences to her plea and the effect they would have on her 
ability to earn a living.  For people like Beth, her defense attorney 
was realistically the only person who may have provided accurate 
and clear advice about the effects of her conviction upon her 
career. 
C.  Sex Offender Registration 
The last person is John, a young man who as a thirteen-year-
old boy, pleaded guilty to second-degree criminal sexual conduct.81  
This charge had been amended down from first-degree criminal 
sexual conduct for inappropriately touching his two-year-old foster 
sister.  John was himself molested as a child and, at the age of 
eleven, was removed from his home and placed into foster care.  
John pleaded guilty and was ordered to complete sex offender 
treatment, which he did at age thirteen.  The results from a 
behavioral psychologist found that this boy was not a predatory 
 
 79. See id. (noting that each subdivision includes disqualification based on 
preponderance of the evidence). 
 80. See Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1483. 
 81. The author met this remarkable young man at a conference when he was 
twenty-one years old. 
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offender and was at a very low risk to reoffend. 
Because John was charged originally with the offense of first-
degree criminal sexual conduct, he must register as a sex offender 
in Minnesota, even though his offense was committed when he was 
thirteen.  At no time did his public defender tell him about this 
registration requirement.  When he entered his plea, he vaguely 
remembers the judge advising him about this requirement.  
However, at age thirteen, John did not understand what it really 
meant.82 
John succeeded in graduating from high school with honors.  
He was accepted to college at a state university and when he filled 
out his housing application for dorm placement he was denied 
access to any dorm on campus.  The denial was not because of his 
criminal conviction, which is sealed because he was a minor, but 
because he has to register as a sex offender, even as an adult.  After 
finding alternative housing at a huge financial cost, John graduated 
from college.  John learned as he was searching for majors that 
almost any professional career, including the one he wanted in law 
enforcement, would not be an option because he had to register as 
a sex offender. 
Section 243.166 of the Minnesota Code is something that every 
defense attorney should read and understand;83 when an individual 
has to register as a sex offender as a result of a criminal conviction, 
that registration limits the individual’s ability to succeed in almost 
every aspect of his or her life.  Because of the registration, many 
basic necessities such as housing and employment are nearly 
impossible for clients to achieve.84  Because the requirement to 
register and the severe consequences that flow as a direct result 
from a conviction are “truly clear,”85 and because they have the 
 
 82. The fact that John did not understand what the judge told him highlights 
why defense attorneys are in the best position to discuss collateral sanctions with 
their clients.  Attorneys are able to discuss the likely collateral consequences that 
stem from a plea at a time in the process when clients can take in this information 
and make an informed choice, rather than when they are standing before a court 
and already entering their plea. 
 83. MINN. STAT. § 243.166 (2008) (explaining the process of registration of 
predatory offenders). 
 84. See id. at subdiv. 1b.  This section does not contain any particular 
restrictions to housing or employment, but it does establish the crimes for which a 
person has to register.  Id.  This requirement to register triggers a myriad of 
collateral sanctions, many of which are often unknown.  Federal housing law 
prevents sex offenders from federal housing.  See 42 U.S.C.A. § 13663(a) (2006). 
 85. See Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1483. 
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potential to permanently derail the future of an individual, they, 
more than any other consequence, meet the Padilla standard.86 
The specific registration requirements, including the 
convictions requiring registration and registration procedure, are 
clearly laid out in section 243.166 of the Minnesota Code.87  For 
example, the crime of criminal sexual conduct in the first-degree, 
which is contained in the list of offenses requiring registration, 
requires individuals to register if they are merely charged with a first-
degree offense, even if they plead to a much lesser charge, and 
even if they are a teenager and their conviction would not follow 
them into adulthood.88  If a person fails to register as provided by 
this statute, then he or she has committed a new felony which 
could result in prison time.89  If a person who is required to register 
is charged with a new crime and spends time in jail, then the 
registration period is automatically extended for ten years.90 
These consequences can be particularly harsh for juveniles 
who are convicted of sexual offenses, and who might be too young 
to understand the serious ramifications of registration after 
entering a plea as a teenager. 
In this case, John’s criminal conviction did not follow him into 
adulthood, but the collateral consequence of registration did.  The 
collateral penalty was worse than the criminal sanction.  John said 
that if he had been aware of the requirement to register for life as a 
direct result of his plea, then he would not have pleaded guilty.  
The Padilla Court’s two-part test91 clearly applies to advising clients 
about registration, a penalty as direct and severe as deportation. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
In Padilla, the Court found that there are serious civil 
consequences that are directly connected to a criminal conviction 
and that defendants should be told about these things at a point in 
the process when they are able to make informed decisions about 
their future with the most accurate information possible.92  Padilla 
 
 86. See supra Section II. 
 87. MINN. STAT. § 243.166, subdiv. 1b (listing offenses where registration is 
required). 
 88. Id. (emphasis added). 
 89. Id. at subdiv. 5 (explaining the criminal penalty for not registering). 
 90. Id. at subdiv. 4(d). 
 91. See supra Section II. 
 92. Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010). 
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goes on to provide a test to determine when a collateral 
consequence is direct and dire enough to require attorneys to 
advise clients about it prior to a plea.93 
In Minnesota, hundreds of consequences to convictions exist.  
However, three stand out as ones that should meet the Padilla test.  
Defense attorneys must perform their duty by advising each client 




 93. See supra Section II. 
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